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Introduction 
This policy brief picks up the main observations and 
arguments included in a study undertaken by CEPS for 
the Directorate-General for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the European 
Commission. It was presented by Iain Begg at a major 
Commission conference in Brussels on 16 April 2008,
2 
which had broad attendance by officials, media people 
and researchers, and was concluded by a keynote 
speech by José Manuel Barroso, President of the 
Commission. The conference took place at a time of 
emerging financial crisis and rising oil and food prices, 
aspects emphasised by some speakers as elements 
throwing new light on some of the arguments in the 
report. Hans-Gert Pöttering, President of the European 
Parliament, stressed that promotion of knowledge and 
innovation constitutes an important condition for 
enhancing the competitiveness of the European 
economy. Thus, the Union should take on a leadership 
role in combining globalisation with social policy, 
fighting climate change and fostering environmental 
stability. Mr. Barroso, in his conclusions underlined the 
necessity of a renewal of social policies based on equal 
opportunities, access and solidarity.  
                                                      
2 Videos of the conference proceedings, speeches and 
presentations are available on the following website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/simglobe_en.htm. 
Globalisation is more an opportunity than a 
menace… 
1.  The study argues that globalisation is much more 
an opportunity for added growth than a social 
menace. Yet, the benefits of globalisation cannot 
just be assumed to happen, and with an increased 
pace of change it is inevitable that there will be 
losers as well as winners, with marked social 
consequences.  
…and the European social model is not 
doomed 
2.  The European social model is not doomed – far 
from it – and the idea that only free market 
approaches are consistent with sustained prosperity 
is clearly wrong. Indeed, the success of the smaller 
open economies testifies to the scope for 
prospering, even with extensive and generous 
welfare states. 
3.  The principal benefits of globalisation stem from 
the scope it affords on the supply side for increased 
specialisation, enhanced diffusion of technology 
and a competitive spur to innovation and 
productivity growth. Consumers gain from lower 
prices and increased choice, while an often 
overlooked benefit on the demand side is that 
emerging markets offer rapidly growing sales 
opportunities for European companies.  
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Globalisation is not a zero-sum game… 
4.  It has also to be repeated that globalisation is not a 
zero-sum game. Nevertheless, in assessing the 
benefits of globalisation and the social impact, 
three issues need to be taken into account:  
•  The gains are not uniformly distributed across 
individuals, regions and countries.  
•  The costs of globalisation are more likely to be 
concentrated in the short run, while the benefits 
will take longer to materialise. So the very 
speed of the globalisation process is part of the 
policy challenge. 
•  The gains will not accrue automatically, but 
will depend instead on successful adaptation, 
which in turn means undertaking appropriate 
and timely competitive, regulatory and social 
reforms. 
...but there are undeniably adverse 
consequences 
5.  The potential threats from unfettered globalisation 
encompass distributive impacts, such as adverse 
consequences for specific groups and regions, 
issues of cultural hegemony, potential 
environmental damage and geo-political disruption. 
Threats may also arise to the stability of public 
finances and from social tensions associated with 
migration. 
6.  Still, even for some of those who might be seen as 
victims of globalisation, it is important to stress the 
following: 
•  There are offsetting effects such as the boost to 
real incomes, which benefit from lower prices 
of imports. 
•  Job losses resulting from international 
competitive effects are small in scale compared 
with normal ‘creative destruction’ in product 
and labour markets.  
•  The pressures on social protection budgets 
from population ageing are much more 
extensive – in fact, off-shoring low value jobs 
and focusing on high value jobs can be seen as 
a logical answer to a declining labour force. 
What is globalisation? 
7.  As a phenomenon of the late 20
th and early 21
st 
centuries, there can be little doubt that 
globalisation is something that resonates widely. 
But it is not easy to pin down conceptually or 
empirically. It comprises the integration of markets 
and supply chains, the development of a global 
capital market, the rapid spread of new or enabling 
technologies and the progressive lowering of costs 
of transactions across national borders. It also 
encompasses cultural convergence and other 
dimensions that often arouse contestation. 
8.  Among the examples cited in the study, stocks of 
foreign investment have risen tenfold as a 
proportion of GDP since 1970. A three-minute 
phone call between New York and London that 
would have cost $293 at today’s prices in 1931 and 
$1 in 2001 is now just a few cents – for a vastly 
better connection.
3  Total freight costs for trade 
between developed countries until recently 
accounted for less than 4% of the value of trade.
4 A 
composite index of globalisation, compiled by the 
Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research, shows 
that globalisation has been on an interrupted 
upward trend since 1970 (Figure 1) and shows no 
sign of abating. 
9.  More recently, there has been an upsurge in the 
extent of migration into the EU, prompted in part 
by conflicts in other parts of the world, but 
attributable more to economic motives as workers 
in other countries seek better opportunities than are 
available at home. In many EU-15 countries, 
immigration from the recently-acceded member 
states has also been substantial, fanning fears about 
the social consequences and burgeoning demands 
on host-country social protection systems, despite 
the compelling evidence that migrants do not abuse 
these systems.  
10. The process of globalisation, including its drivers 
and social consequences, is summarised and 
illustrated in Figure 2.  
11. Globalisation is not a static phenomenon, however, 
and there is no certainty that it will either continue 
along the same path or remain a predominantly 
American-led and neo-liberal phenomenon. Indeed, 
it has already acquired more of an ‘Asian face’, 
notably with the emergence of China (and now 
India) as rapidly expanding economies. As they 
evolve from low-cost competitors in mass markets 
to become major consumer markets, they can be 
expected to become progressively more innovative 
and to contribute to the development of new 
technologies, rather than simply importing 
technologies. 
                                                      
3 See A. Krueger, “Globalization and International 
Locational Competition”, Lecture at symposium in honour of 
Herbert Giersch, Kiel Institute, 11 May 2006. 
4 See the website of the Roundtable of International Shipping 
Associations (http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/ 
worldtrade/costs.php). The recent increase in the price of oil 
will have resulted in some increase in transport costs but not 
on a scale capable of modifying the ‘rules of the game’ in 
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Figure 1. Globalisation’s unrelenting rise 
 
Source: Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research website (2007). 
12. Increasingly, too, businesses are finding new ways 
of subdividing economic activity among nations. In 
particular, an emerging trend is for tasks within the 
value chain to be ‘unbundled’ and traded between 
nations, rather than whole products or services. As 
a result, the crude idea that it is the unskilled who 
lose from globalisation while highly qualified 
workers gain has to be replaced by a more subtle 
analysis. India today competes not just on the cost 
of its unskilled workers in producing mature mass-
manufactured goods such as clothing, but also in 
skill-intensive areas such as software development 
and medical diagnostics. 
13. Many in Europe fear these developments and are 
pessimistic about the outlook for the values, 
institutions and policies that have underpinned 
post-war Europe’s success and way of life. Opinion 
polls testify to the strength of these fears, with 
more EU citizens regarding globalisation as a threat 
to their jobs rather than an opportunity. Some argue 
that – to use a much touted expression – a ‘race to 
the bottom’ in social policy and provision is 
inevitable. 
14. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence for an erosion 
of social provision is, quite simply, striking 
because of its absence. Social protection outlays as 
a proportion of GDP have remained remarkably 
stable over the last two decades and it is 
noteworthy that some of the most successful 
economies in northern Europe achieve high 
employment rates and enviable degrees of equity, 
while also retaining large public sectors. Similarly, 
the data show continuing progress towards widely 
supported social aims such as diminishing gender 
imbalances in pay and increasing employment 
rates, even though these gaps remain sizeable. The 
inference to draw from these observations is that it 
is not the magnitude of extensive welfare provision, 
but how it is configured that most affects 
competitive success. 
What are the core policy challenges? 
15. Many of the fears surrounding globalisation are 
greatly exaggerated and even where justified tend 
to rest on an incomplete analysis of the process. It 
follows that to view globalisation as an inexorable 
and threatening force is simply unwarranted. This 
message has to be repeatedly articulated and ‘sold’ 
to citizens. Still, it is clear that globalisation will be 
a bumpy ride, that it cannot be ignored as a major 
determinant of the well-being of Europeans and 
that it will require extensive and sensitively applied 
adjustment policies.  
16. The most important message for policy-makers is 
that in order for the EU and its member states to 
ensure that the balance of effects of globalisation is 
as positive as possible, a range of policy responses 
will be required. A core challenge is to achieve 
economic flexibility with better social protection, 
so as to foster an environment capable of making 
the best use of the opportunities offered by 
globalisation. In this context, social policy has a 
vital role to play, not least in endowing people with 
capabilities, with an emphasis on active policies 
that intervene early rather than passive, reactive 
policies. The policy challenges of globalisation can 
be grouped under three main headings:  
•  equipping the economy to compete in the 
globalising age, 
•  smoothing adjustment and  
•  improving socio-economic governance.  
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Figure 2. Schematic overview of the process of globalisation 
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17. The Lisbon strategy is in many ways a response to 
globalisation, insofar as its primary aims are to 
reposition the EU in the global economy; yet it is 
important to recall that the strategy also has as key 
goals creating employment and assuring social 
cohesion. 
18. But a strategy that ‘only’ targets growth and jobs 
may not be enough and will need to be 
complemented by effective policies to protect those 
who lose from globalisation. Much can be achieved 
by retraining and other active policies aimed at 
redeploying workers, although there will be some 
groups beyond the reach of such measures. 
Modernised solidarity policies should therefore be 
seen as an essential weapon in the policy armoury. 
The governance challenge is to put in place 
mechanisms that achieve these aims without 
imposing an undue burden on competitiveness.  
19. Thus, while labour market policies have to be at the 
forefront of an adaptation strategy, a coherent and 
complementary strategy for social protection and 
social inclusion remains vital. The ease with which 
adjustment can be achieved will also be shaped by 
the degree to which member state governments are 
prepared to cooperate, both within the EU and in 
wider fora. Regulatory fragmentation and the 
dominance of national regulatory regimes could 
result in a zero- or negative-sum game, the prospect 
of which reinforces the importance of effective 
coordination processes at the EU level. The 
governance challenge is to ensure that the existing 
processes (including the Lisbon agenda, the 
sustainable development strategy and the open 
method of coordination of social protection and 
social inclusion) are ‘owned’ and accepted by 
member states, but also do not conflict in their aims 
and orientations. 
Globalisation will increase uncertainties… 
20. Adjusting to globalisation implies policy 
developments that will in turn have social impacts 
and create uncertainties that need to be managed as 
social risks. Labour turnover can be expected to 
grow higher, putting a premium on the 
transferability and adaptability of skills, but also on 
suitable forms of flexibility in the workplace as 
well as on promoting individuals’ participation. 
Although active labour market policies are seen as 
part of the answer, they are not a panacea and need 
to be complemented by other policies. Moreover, 
they are often costly and are prone to inappropriate 
incentives. An implication is that policy learning 
and experimentation are needed to find solutions 
that are effective, as well as attuned to conditions in 
the different member states. 
….but policy measures should favour the 
capacity to adjust 
21. Many reforms, notably the reforms envisaged in the 
Lisbon agenda, will improve the benefits/costs ratio 
of globalisation in the long term, yet have a short-
term impact – often negative – on social cohesion 
that makes them politically awkward to implement. 
In this perspective, however, it is important that  
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whatever the measures envisaged for countering 
negative social impacts, they should favour and not 
hamper adjustment to changing conditions.  
22. Compared with the US, the EU has been shown by 
the EU’s Economic Policy Committee to be less 
effective at re-employing workers who lose their 
jobs as a result of restructuring (whether induced 
by globalisation or not). At the same time, there are 
marked differences between member states in this 
regard, with the implication that there are lessons to 
be learned from those that manage best. 
23. To the extent that it is the lower skilled who are 
most vulnerable to the effects of globalisation, 
there are grounds for labour market policies aimed 
specifically at these groups. Yet, it has also to be 
recognised that globalisation does not stand still. 
The most probable scenario for globalisation is that 
the main trends will broadly continue over the next 
15 years. Hence, it is reasonable to expect further 
increases in trade intensity, financial market 
integration and the spread of technology. Whether 
and how the very speed of this process can and 
should be slowed down may be part of the policy 
consideration at the highest level, but is regarded as 
beyond the scope of social policy and of the study 
discussed here. 
24. Nevertheless, solutions are needed to the ‘catch 22’ 
problem that many of those most affected by 
globalisation are the least able to reconnect to the 
labour market. A way forward is an ‘active 
inclusion’ policy in which there is support for 
minimum incomes and access to quality social 
services, as well as labour market support. Services 
such as childcare may well be part of the equation, 
not least for target groups such as female migrants.  
25. In addition, early intervention to improve the 
quality of basic education should be part of a shift 
in emphasis in the welfare state to prevent the 
emergence of social problems. 
Globalisation is not the only rationale for 
reinventing the welfare state… 
26. Responding to globalisation is only one rationale 
for reinventing the welfare state and it would miss a 
trick if it meant no more than ‘compensating’ those 
who suffer most from more intense international 
competition. Policy mechanisms and institutions 
have to be adapted to the changing economic 
environment, recognising that the ensuing social 
effects are not always directly attributable to 
globalisation, but result from the reactions of 
employment and wage formation. 
27. The core of a social policy response is in the 
following main policy domains: education and 
training, immigration policy, labour market reforms 
and the reshaping of social protection. There is in 
addition an international governance dimension to 
consider, especially in the light of the EU’s 
commitment to international obligations as part of 
its sustainable development strategy. 
28. With regard to training and skills, these can and 
should be enhanced by due attention to the level of 
education of vulnerable target groups. It is 
especially important to extend adult training and 
learning beyond those who already have a high 
level of educational attainment. 
29. In relation to migration, there is an evident need for 
new and more comprehensive policies to promote 
the social integration of different types of migrants 
into the economy and society of the host country. 
An active approach to the inclusion of immigrants 
should therefore be part of solidarity. Furthermore, 
given that national migration policies are bound to 
have externalities for other member states, 
establishing common principles and approaches is a 
pressing matter.  
…and the challenge is to respond to new 
paradigms and associated risks by 
reconfiguring it in ways consistent with the 
values espoused by the European social 
model 
30. Drawing on insights from various contributors to 
the analysis of how social Europe is changing and 
what makes it likely that a country will prosper in 
the globalised economy, a number of characteristics 
can be identified. These are summarised in Table 1. 
31. The challenge facing welfare reform is not about 
defending or opposing levels of social expenditure 
or casting doubt on specific benefits or rules. 
Successful welfare states respond to new paradigms 
and associated risks not by cutting back, but by 
reconfiguring in ways consistent with values such 
as those espoused by the European social model. 
Our fond hope is that the discourse on globalisation 
can be altered to reflect this analysis.  
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Table 1. Synthesis of the changing focus of social policies in response to globalisation 
Outdated or increasingly less effective approaches  Approaches consistent with benefiting from globalisation 
Different components of flexicurity 
Strong protection of existing jobs  Support for the individual to redeploy 
Passive income support for the unemployed  Active labour market policies 
Easy access to early retirement  Encouragement of older workers 
Rights to a range of social services and benefits  Conditions on eligibility 
Protections linked to employment  New interpretation of social justice 
Economic activity model 
Male, full-time breadwinner  Gender mix with flexible working times 
Industrial policy that promotes ‘champions’  SMEs and new sectors 
Manufacturing as a core activity  A knowledge economy 
Regulated labour and product markets  ‘Better’ regulation; flexibility in managing 
Stability Growth 
Physical capital  Human capital and research 
Marginalisation of migrant workers  Economic and social integration of migrants 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
About CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS) is among the most experienced and authoritative 
think tanks operating in the European Union today. CEPS serves 
as a leading forum for debate on EU affairs, but its most 
distinguishing feature lies in its strong in-house research 
capacity, complemented by an extensive network of partner 
institutes throughout the world.  
CEPS’ funding is obtained from a variety of sources, including 
membership fees, project research, foundation grants, 
conferences fees, publication sales and an annual grant from the 
European Commission. 
Goals 
•  To carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to 
solutions to the challenges facing Europe today. 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and 
maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders 
in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-
makers and business representatives across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular 
flow of publications and public events. 
Assets 
•  Complete independence to set its own research priorities 
and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Formation of nine different research networks, comprising 
research institutes from throughout Europe and beyond, to 
complement and consolidate CEPS research expertise and 
to greatly extend its outreach. 
•  An extensive membership base of some 120 Corporate 
Members and 130 Institutional Members, which provide 
expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding 
board for CEPS policy proposals. 
 
Programme Structure 
CEPS carries out its research via its own in-house research 
programmes and through collaborative research networks 
involving the active participation of other highly reputable 
institutes and specialists: 
Research Programmes 
Economic & Social Welfare Policies 
Energy, Climate Change & Sustainable Development 
EU Neighbourhood, Foreign & Security Policy 
Financial Markets & Taxation 
Justice & Home Affairs 
Politics & European Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Trade, Development & Agricultural Policy 
Research Networks/Joint Initiatives 
Changing Landscape of Security & Liberty (CHALLENGE) 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
European Network of Agricultural & Rural Policy Research 
Institutes (ENARPRI) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes 
(ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
European Security Forum (ESF) 
 
In the context of its research programmes and networks, CEPS 
organises a variety of activities, involving its members and other 
stakeholders in the European policy debate, national and EU-
level policy-makers, academics, corporate executives, NGOs 
and the media. These activities include task forces, conferences, 
lunchtime membership meetings, briefings, training seminars 
and major annual events (e.g. the CEPS Annual Conference).  
 
Website: http://www.ceps.eu 
Bookshop: http://shop.ceps.eu 